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1. Viewing a New World 
 
In his study of the Europeans‟ first encounters with the New World in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries the historian of ideas, Anthony Pagden, writes that the European 
“observers ... had to classify before they could properly see; and in order to do that they 
had no alternative but to appeal to a system which was already in use. It was indeed the 
system, not the innate structure of the world, which determined what areas they selected 
for description.” (Pagden 1982: 4-5) For Pagden the order of comprehension of this 
New World was classification, observation, representation: the conceptualisation of the 
world came before the world itself could be reproduced for a wider audience. On this 
basis, it was the classification - not simply the world - that formed the representation. 
 This sounds straightforward, but in practice there were complications. Pagden 
writes that the European observer had an inadequate “descriptive vocabulary” for the 
New World, and was “beset by an uncertainty about how to use his conceptual tools in 
an unfamiliar terrain;” that “he tended to describe things which looked alike as if they 
were, in fact, identical.” For Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, “author of the earliest 
natural history of America, pumas were lions, jaguars, tigers and so on.” Pagden explains 
this conflation of different species by suggesting that “Immediate perceptions of this 
kind relied upon an implicit and at first unchallenged belief in the interchangeability of 
types and the consistency of natural forms.” (Pagden 1982: 11) To early modern 
observers this New World was new, but it was also, importantly, familiar; this, we can 
see, must always be the case if systems of classification are transferred across 
geographical - and conceptual - boundaries. Difference is reduced through the assertion 
of likeness or recognisability. 
This sense of the categorisation (and understanding) of the New World can be 
traced in the English colonialist Alexander Whitaker‟s 1613 Good Newes From Virginia. In 
this text - written as propaganda for the London-based Virginia Company - Whitaker 
takes the time to mention some of the wildlife of the New World and, as well as 
acknowledging recognisable animals such as “Lions, Beares, Wolves and Deare” (“lions” 
here must - like Oviedo‟s definition of a puma - refer to another big cat rather than the 
lion itself which is indigenous to Africa and, before extinction, to areas of eastern Europe 
and Asia: not to the Americas). But Whitaker also describes one of the „strange‟ 
(unfamiliar) creatures he has encountered: 
 
the female Possown, which will let forth her young out of her bellie, and take 
them up into her bellie againe at her pleasure without hurt to her selfe, neither 
think this to be a Travellers tale, but the very truth; for nature hath framed her 
fit for that service, my eyes have been witnes unto it, and we have sent of them 
and their young ones into England. (Whitaker 1613: 41) 
 
The “Possown” is the opossum, an animal currently classified as a marsupial. To 
Alexander Whitaker, however, this word - „marsupial‟ - would have been meaningless. As 
a designation of a particular class of mammal differentiated “by the bearing of very 
immature young which are typically nursed in an abdominal pouch” (OED) this 
term was first used in the early nineteenth century (and the term „mammal‟, of course, 
only entered usage in Carolus Linnaeus‟ Systema Naturae in 1758; that is 145 years after 
Whitaker wrote about the opossum). For Whitaker the possown was a remarkable 
animal, more like a creature from a fictional text - the “traveller‟s tale” he mentions and 
refuses - than natural history. In fact, a creature very like Whitaker‟s possown might be 
found in just such a fictional traveller‟s tale half a century later. In Paradise Lost (1667) 
John Milton relates Satan‟s journey from Pandemonium to Paradise and tells of Satan‟s 
encounter with the half-woman, half-serpent, Sin, at the gates of Hell: 
 
   about her middle round 
A cry of hell hounds never ceasing barked 
With wide Cerberian mouths full loud, and rung 
A hideous peal: yet, when they list, would creep, 
If aught disturbed their noise, into her womb, 
And kennel there, yet there still barked and howled, 
Within unseen. (Milton 1968: II, lines 653-659) 
 
These “hell hounds” are the monstrous product of the incestuous rape of Sin by her son 
Death, and, as Sin herself narrates: 
 
These yelling monsters that with ceaseless cry 
Surround me, as thou sawest, hourly conceived 
And hourly born, with sorrow infinite 
To me, for when they list into the womb 
That bred them they return, and howl and gnaw 
My bowels, their repast; then bursting forth 
Afresh with conscious terror vex me round, 
That rest or intermission none I find. (Milton 1968: Book II, lines 795-802) 
 
The source for this image that is suggested by Alastair Fowler, the editor of the finest 
modern edition of Paradise Lost, is Guillaume de Salluste Du Bartas‟ Du Bartas his devine 
weekes and workes, first published in English in 1605. Here is written: 
 
I feare the beast, bred in the bloodie Coast 
Of Canibals, which thousand times (almost) 
Re-whelpes her whelpes, and in her tender wombe, 
She doth as oft her living brood re-toomb. (Du Bartas 1605: 201-2) 
 
This animal, named in the margin as the “Chiurca”, is located, for Du Bartas, with the 
cannibals; and cannibals, more often than not in this period, were believed to live in the 
New World. The chiurca carries with her not the life-giving properties of the familiar 
bear, who licks her whelps into shape (Du Bartas 1605: 16), but rather the deathly 
qualities of the grave-like womb.  
It is unsurprising in these terms that we can trace a direct link between the 
zoological novelty described by Alexander Whitaker and the mythological horror 
represented by John Milton. If animals are seen through the categories that already exist 
in, and organise the world, and if there is no category into which to place a strange 
creature then it is impossible to make sense of, to place, that creature and as a response 
the line between the natural and the supernatural, between animal and monster, might be 
traversed. It is as if when the facts appear to exceed the possibility of comprehension 
there are two choices: one, the category of the anomalous (a class of the unclassifiable) is 
invoked (this emerges again in a later reading of the opossum discussed below); or, as in 
Whitaker‟s and Du Bartas‟ work, fiction is invoked. The possown, or chiurca, becomes a 
symbol of the cannibalising nature of the New World; an image of the self-destructive 
nature of sin in a world in which apparently natural and - importantly - civil constructs 
such as marriage are constantly breached in the uncivilised anarchy that many Europeans 
saw when they looked at the native peoples of the New World (see Cummings 1999). 
Eventually both further empirical examination and the creation of a new 
classification allow the strange new creature to be placed within the realm of what is 
known. The wild, you might say, is caged within the taxonomy of the civil. But, of 
course, the mere existence of a category does not help to make sense of the exterior 
world in any simple terms. Classification does not simply label; as Friedrich Nietzsche 
argued in the second-half of the nineteenth century, categories construct meaning; they 
do not simply help to understand the already-existing fact: 
 
If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, 
declare „look, a mammal,‟ I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but 
it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic 
truth which contains not a single point which would be „true in itself‟ or really 
and universally valid apart from man. (Nietzsche 1979: 85) 
 
Such a recognition - that the way in which we classify animals is not part of the 
natural order but is a human imposition on the natural world and is central to our 
understanding of that natural world - is commonplace, and is understood by those who 
perform the classification. In 1698, for example, the English anatomist Edward Tyson 
anatomised a female opossum and noted:  
 
since it is an animal sui generis, and in several parts has a great resemblance to 
those of different species, I think a denomination might be best given to it, 
from that particular in which it is most distinguished from all others; which is 
that remarkable pouch or marsupium it has in the belly; into which, on any 
occasion of danger, it can receive its young: whence it may properly be 
denominated Marsupiale Americanum; and it seems best referrible to the 
vermine kind, as far as may be judged from this specimen, which is a female. 
(Tyson 1809: 248-9) 
 
Tyson acknowledges that a new way of classifying is required because the animal before 
him challenges the classification system that he uses by its merging of so many different 
species; by its refusal to fit comfortably into only one class. And it is important that, for 
Tyson, the opossum is not simply to be regarded as imitative, despite its likeness to 
numerous other animals (it is likened, in his anatomy, to a pig, a human, a monkey, a 
squirrel and a cat). On the contrary, Tyson argues that the opossum is “an animal sui 
generis”; that is, it is peculiar, of its own kind. For this reason the unique nature of its 
pouch, rather than the shared nature of so many of its other features, forms the basis for 
the classification. Here the taxonomy is being made to fit the New World into the old, 
and as such it reveals the limitation - the Eurocentrism - of the old world‟s system of 
classification.  (For later debates about the nature of the opossum and other marsupials 
see Ritvo 1997: 5-15) 
 The nature of the impact of such shifts in classification on human understanding 
is, I think, worth revisiting, and another moment from the seventeenth century will 
illustrate the point I wish to make. In 1680, eighteen years before his anatomy of the 
opossum, Edward Tyson performed another dissection for the Royal Society; this time of 
a “Porpess”. For Tyson, writing more than seventy years before Linnaeus‟ classificatory 
system, the natural world was at its most straightforward organised around three key 
classes: creatures of air, land and water. The porpoise is a creature of the water and is 
therefore a “fish”. It is with these apparently unquestionable facts in mind that Tyson 
performs his anatomy, and takes note of the oddities that he is seeing: 
 
The structure of the viscera and inward Parts have so great an Analogy and 
resemblance to those of Quadrupeds, that we find them here almost the same. 
The greatest difference from them seems to be in the external shape, and 
wanting feet. But here too we observed that when the skin and flesh was taken 
off, the fore-fins did very well represent an Arm, there being the Scapula, an os 
Humeri, the Ulna, and Radius, the bones of the Carpus, the Metacarp, and 5 digiti 
curiously joynted; the Tayle too does very well supply the defect of feet both in 
swimming as also leaping in the water, as if both hinder-feet were colligated 
into one, though it consisted not of articulated bones but rather Tendons and 
Cartilages. (Tyson 1680: 16-17) 
 
Tyson continues his anatomy, looking at the animal‟s internal organs: kidney, bladder, 
stomach etc. He then turns to what is, clearly, the most troubling part of this fish‟s 
anatomy: 
 
This leads me to the Examination of the Organs of Generation in this Animal, 
which no less than the other parts did extremely imitate those of Quadrupeds; 
and even in the whole dissection I could easilier imagine I was cutting up a 
Dog, a Swine, a Calf or any other terrestrial Brute, than an inhabitant of the 
watery Element. (Tyson 1680: 26) 
 
What, Tyson seems to be wondering, am I seeing? Is this a fish or a quadruped; a 
creature of the water or the land? Historian of science, F.J. Cole, writing in 1944, is clear 
on Tyson‟s intellectual failure here:  
 
after carefully reviewing evidence which demonstrated conspicuously that the 
porpoise must be a mammal, Tyson nowhere has the courage to declare that it 
is not a fish, for once attaching more importance to habitat than to structure. 
He says he should like to think it was a mammal, but further than this he did 
not go. (Cole 1944: 201) 
 
It is, I think, Cole‟s terminology that is problematic here. Clearly Tyson did not have the 
category „mammal‟ to use in 1680 because it had not yet been created and so Cole‟s 
assertion that Tyson “should like to think it was a mammal” is wrong. But Cole is surely 
right to note that Tyson stares at the possibility of a new class of creature but refuses to 
acknowledge it. The porpoise, despite all the evidence to the contrary, remains a fish, 
simply because it lives in water.  
 A parallel moment of observation and what we might term the observer‟s 
categorical blindness can be found almost seventy years earlier in William Shakespeare‟s 
play The Tempest (1611). Here, Trinculo, a survivor of the tempest of the title, arrives on 
the „new world‟ of Prospero‟s island and comes upon the monstrous slave, Caliban, half-
hidden under his cloak. Just as the Spanish and English colonialists in the New World 
debated the nature of the natives - were they human or not? (see Hanke 1959; and 
Pagden 1982) - so Trinculo wonders what it is he sees lying before him: 
 
What have we here, a man or a fish? Dead or alive? - A fish, he smells like a 
fish; a very ancient and fish-like smell; a kind of not-of-the-newest poor-john. 
A strange fish! (Shakespeare 1988: 2.2, 24-27) 
 
The myths of the monstrosity of the inhabitants of faraway lands had travelled across 
history from Pliny in the first century C.E. and inform Trinculo‟s assessment of the being 
he sees lying before him (see Friedman 1981). Writing in the mid-fourteenth century, for 
example, Sir John Mandeville stated of one group of islands he has apparently visited (it 
is more likely that he, if there was a single individual who was Mandeville, read lots of 
books than that he actually did any travelling): 
 
There is a race of great stature, like giants, foul and horrible to look at; they 
have one eye only, in the middle of their foreheads. They eat raw flesh and raw 
fish. In another part, there are ugly folk without heads, who have eyes in each 
shoulder; their mouths are round, like a horseshoe, in the middle of their chest. 
In yet another part there are headless men whose eyes and mouths are on their 
backs. (Mandeville 1983: 137) 
 
It is this kind of being that Trinculo expects to see, and it is this myth of monstrous 
humans that informs his question, “What have we here, a man or a fish?” But, as 
Trinculo‟s investigation of this strange being continues the failure of the classificatory 
system he is using to make sense of this new world is made clear: “Legged like a man,” 
he exclaims, “and his fins like arms!” (Shakespeare 1988: 2.2, 33-34) If this creature has 
legs like a man, and has fins that look like arms, doesn‟t that mean that he has legs and 
arms, and no fins at all? Doesn‟t it mean that the creature Trinculo is observing is simply 
a human? In fact, the monster Trinculo sees is not the creature on the ground but the 
creature in his own imagination. It is the point from which the observation has taken 
place that is the problem; it is Trinculo‟s categorical blindness that has created the 
monster. 
  
 
2. The Historicity of Viewing 
 
Why this foray into early modern intellectual history? My aim in introducing this special 
issue is to highlight a theme common to all of the essays that follow, and to underline an 
assumption shared by all of the writers whose work is included in this issue. The brief 
history of the European interpretation of the inhabitants - human and animal - of the 
New World reinforces, I think, the importance of context in the interpretation of any 
human encounter with an animal. It might seem absurd to us that observers would 
assume that the opossum‟s young crawled back up into her womb, but that is perhaps not 
only because we have made technical advances that make observing such animals easier; 
it is also, surely, because we have the category „marsupial‟ to think with. The link between 
Whitaker‟s empiricism and Milton‟s poetry is made because both men - although there 
were fifty years between them - were thinking with very similar categories: and a pouch - 
a kind of external womb - was not something they had encountered before. 
It is this kind of understanding that I think can be traced in all of the six essays 
included in this issue. The context these writers focus on can be historical - when the 
encounter took place; it can be intellectual - how the encounter was understood to 
happen; or it can be geographical - where it took place. Whichever framework is 
addressed, the encounter with the animal can only be understood through an 
understanding of its context. This sounds straightforward, but the implications of such a 
statement are, perhaps, worth pausing over. One way of outlining the issues at stake is to 
turn to another moment when context was cited as significant; not to the early modern 
period once again, but to early modern studies. 
In his seminal essay, “The Circulation of Social Energy” (1988) the New 
Historicist critic Stephen Greenblatt argued for the importance of history in the reading 
of literary texts and he sets out seven “abjurations” for the critic: 
 
1. There can be no appeals to genius as the sole origin of the energies of 
great art. 
2. There can be no motiveless creation. 
3. There can be no transcendent or timeless or unchanging representation. 
4. There can be no autonomous artifacts. 
5. There can be no expression without an origin and an object, a from and a 
for. 
6. There can be no art without social energy. 
7. There can be no spontaneous generation of social energy.  (Greenblatt 
1988, 12) 
 
For Greenblatt, “social energy” is a primarily rhetorical energy by which literary 
materials, in particular, can be seen to succeed in their power:  it is, he writes, “associated 
with repeatable forms of pleasure and interest, with the capacity to arouse disquiet, pain, 
fear, the beating of the heart, pity, laughter, tension, relief, wonder.” (Greenblatt 1988: 6) 
We might assume that such arousals are particular to fictions, and that the factual nature 
of the observation, classification and representation of animals would require a very 
different “energy”; but, as some of the essays that follow in this special issue show, 
reactions such as fear, pity and wonder remain central to the human response to animals; 
even when those responses are framed as „scientific‟. Thus, where Greenblatt is writing 
of literature - in particular he is looking at the plays of Shakespeare - we can, I think, 
usefully adapt his ideas to think about human-animal relations. Where Greenblatt writes 
of art, we might think about the processes of observation, classification and 
representation. In this sense, we can transpose his abjurations for the literary critic into 
the following abjurations for the analyst of human-animal relations: 
 
 
1. There can be no appeals to nature as the sole origin of the energies of the 
human observation, classification and representation of the natural world. 
2. There can be no motiveless creation in the human observation, 
classification and representation of the natural world. 
3. There can be no transcendent or timeless or unchanging observation, 
classification or representation of the natural world. 
4. There can be no autonomous artifacts: all observations, classifications 
and representations are embedded in wider historical, social, intellectual 
and cultural structures. 
5. There can be no observation, classification, or representation of the 
natural world without an origin and an object, a from and a for. 
6. There can be no human observation, classification and representation of 
the natural world without social energy. 
7. There can be no spontaneous generation of social energy. 
 
But it is not simply that observations, classifications and representations of 
animals are to be embedded in their own histories. As Louis E. Montrose, another New 
Historicist critic, has proposed: “The post-structuralist orientation to history ... may be 
characterized chiastically, as a reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the 
textuality of history.” (Montrose 1989: 20) For those of us interested in animals, we can 
translate this to think about the simultaneous historicity of observations, classifications 
and representations and the textuality - the constructed-nature - of all encounters with 
the natural world. The representations of animals we are so familiar with, that come in so 
many areas of academic work - from biology and zoology through philosophy to literary 
studies, history, and film studies - are all constructions of their wider culture and are also 
themselves constructing that culture. Jacques Derrida argued that that human “Interpretive 
decisions (in all their metaphysical, ethical, juridical, and political consequences) ... 
depend on what is presupposed by the general singular of this word Animal” (Derrida 
2002: 409): that it is the construction of this category (existing in absolute opposition to 
„human‟) that has allowed for philosophy. We can likewise argue that it is through our 
observation, classification and representation of animals that so much of what we 
understand as culture, ideas, emotions have been created. We make animals, you might 
say, but animals simultaneously make us. As Cary Wolfe has argued: “the other-than-
human resides at the very core of the human itself, not as the untouched, ethical antidote 
to reason but as part of reason itself.” (Wolfe 2003: 17) 
It is for this reason that this special issue, “Viewing Animals” is important. The 
ways in which we look at animals - now and in the past and in the future - are central to 
the ways in which we live with them, think with them, use them. If, as Nigel Rothfels 
argues, „elephant‟ can have such varied meanings, what is an elephant? A simple 
definition is hard to come by. If the responses of rabbits to the death of a companion are 
so varied, as Julie Smith shows, then doesn‟t that, likewise, make any simplistic 
classification of rabbits problematic? But, the interest can be reversed: we can look at 
interpretations of human-animal relations as well. Jonathan Burt looks at John Berger‟s 
seminal essay, “Why Look at Animals?” and finds in it an often ignored problematic 
historical and critical construction of both the past and the notion of looking. Brett 
Mizelle‟s study of the display of animals in the early American republic reminds us that 
there were, in the past, very different ways of looking, and writing about looking at, 
animals. Moving us back to the present, Erica Sheen‟s study of the debates surrounding 
the Disney live-action films 101 Dalmations and 102 Dalmations explores the ways in which 
viewing a fiction might – or might not - have an impact upon living with real dalmations. 
The final essay in this special issue - Charles Bergman‟s - takes us beyond looking at 
animals, and asks about the status of remote radio telemetry on human relations with 
animals. What does it mean that, with this new technology, we can watch animals 
without even seeing them?  
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